COSMIC PHILOSOPHY 



in support of it, it follows that, at any time, the 

 inconceivableness of its negation is the deepest 

 test any belief admits of. Objective facts are 

 ever impressing themselves upon us ; our ex- 

 perience is a register of these objective facts ; 

 and the inconceivableness of a thing implies 

 that it is wholly at variance with the register. 

 Even were this all, it is not clear how, if every 

 truth is primarily inductive, any better test of 

 truth could exist. But it must be remembered, 

 that whilst many of these facts impressing them- 

 selves upon us are occasional, whilst others 

 again are very general, some are universal and 

 are unchanging. These universal and unchang- 

 ing facts are, by the hypothesis, certain to es- 

 tablish beliefs of which the negations are incon- 

 ceivable ; whilst the others are not certain to do 

 this ; and if they do, subsequent facts will re- 

 verse their action." 



As this position has been vehemently attacked 

 by Mr. Mill, who hardly admits for the test of 

 inconceivableness any validity whatever, some 

 further explanation is desirable. It must not be 

 supposed that, in erecting such a canon of truth, 

 we are imitating those high a priori metaphysi- 

 cians, who regard all their cherished traditional 

 notions as infallible intuitions, because of their 

 professed inability to disbelieve them. This is 

 a confusion of which Mr. Mill has not suc- 

 ceeded in keeping clear, and which has led him 

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