THE TEST OF TRUTH 



unintentionally to misrepresent the position 

 taken by Mr. Spencer and Mr. Lewes. 



The confusion arises from the double sense 

 of the word belief^ and the accompanying am- 

 biguous use of the term inconceivable. By a sin- 

 gular freak of language we use the word belief 

 to designate both the least persistent and the 

 most persistent coherence among our states of 

 consciousness, — to describe our state of mind 

 with reference both to those propositions of the 

 truth of which we are least certain, and to 

 those of the truth of which we are most certain. 

 We apply it to states of mind which have no- 

 thing in common, except that they cannot be 

 justified by a chain of logical proofs. For ex- 

 ample, you believe, perhaps, that all crows are 

 black, but being unable to furnish absolutely 

 convincing demonstration of the proposition, 

 you say that you believe it, not that you know 

 it.^ You also believe in your own personal ex- 

 istence, of which, however, you can furnish no 

 logical demonstration, simply because it is an 

 ultimate fact in your consciousness which under- 

 lies and precedes all demonstration. So with 

 the axioms of geometry. If asked what are our 



1 The source of this confusion is the failure to distinguish 

 between the kind of belief which remains after *' the reduc- 

 tion of inferences to sensations," and that which is founded in 

 a ** reliance on unverified inferences." — See Lewes, Prob- 

 lems of Life and Mindy vol. i. p. 369. 



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