THE TEST OF TRUTH 



that Mr. Spencer or his follower^ have ever 

 maintained is this : that although we have no 

 experience of the objective order in itself, we 

 have experience of the manner in which the 

 objective order affects us. Though we have no 

 experience of noumena, we have experience of 

 phenomena. And when experience generates in 

 us a subjective order of conceptions that cannot 

 be altered, we have the strongest possible war- 

 rant that the order of our conceptions corre- 

 sponds to the order of phenomena. Expressed 

 in this abstract terminology, the precise shade 

 of my meaning may be difficult to catch and fix ; 

 but a concrete illustration will, I trust, do away 

 with the difficulty. If the subjective order of 

 my conceptions is such that the concept of a 

 solid lump of iron and the concept of a body 

 floating in water will destroy each other rather 

 than be joined together, and I therefore say that 

 a solid lump of iron will not float in water, what 

 do I mean by it ? Do I intend any statement 

 concerning the unknown external thing, or 

 things, which when acting upon my conscious- 

 ness causes in me the perceptions of iron, and 

 water, and floating or sinking? By no means. 

 I do not even imply that such modes of exist- 

 ence as iron or water, or such modes of activity 

 as floating or sinking, pertain to the unknown 

 external reality at all. It is impossible for us to 

 realize, but it is nevertheless imaginable, that to 



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