PHENOMENON AND NOUMENON 



of psychologic induction. What we refuse to 

 admit is the legitimacy of the idealist's inference 

 that the Unknown Reality beyond conscious- 

 ness does not exist. We assert, on the contrary, 

 that the doctrine of relativity cannot even be 

 intelligibly stated without postulating the exist- 

 ence of this Unknown Reality, which is inde- 

 pendent of us. The proposition that the tree 

 or the mountain exists as tree or mountain only 

 in so far as it is cognized, becomes utter non- 

 sense when we seek to suppress the conception 

 of a persistent Something which becomes tree 

 or mountain in being cognized. 



Before proceeding farther to develop this ar- 

 gument, we may fitly include Positivism along 

 with Idealism as opposed to the conclusion 

 which we are about to defend. The position of 

 Positivism with reference to this question has 

 never been definitely stated by Comte, or by his 

 most eminent and consistent disciple, M. Littre, 

 and it may indeed be doubted whether, with all 

 their remarkable endowments of another sort, 

 either of these thinkers has ever given evidence 

 of enough power of psychologic analysis to 

 grapple with such a problem. It is certain that 

 M. Littre neither admits nor understands (so 

 as to state it correctly) the Spencerian doctrine 

 that there exists an Unknowable Reality ; and 

 it will be amply shown hereafter that Comte not 

 only ignored the existence of such a Reality, but 

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