COSMIC PHILOSOPHY 



that this which persists at all times, under all 

 circumstances, and cannot cease until conscious- 

 ness ceases, has the highest validity of any." ^ 



We have now reached a point at which we 

 may make specific mention of the Scepticism of 

 Hume, which is simply Idealism carried a step 

 farther, to the denial of the existence of any sub- 

 jective, as well as of any objective reality. It 

 was easy for Hume, in criticising Berkeley, to 

 show that we know no more of Mind in itself 

 than of Matter in itself; since what we know 

 is only our states of consciousness. But when 

 Hume proceeded to argue that nothing can be 

 known to exist save the series of impressions or 

 states of consciousness which we interpret as 

 occurring in ourselves, he fell into the very same 

 error of inference into which Berkeley had fallen. 

 We may admit, with Hume, that we know no- 

 thing directly save modifications of conscious- 

 ness. Changes of consciousness are indeed the 

 materials out of which our knowledge is entirely 

 built. But there can be no changes in our con- 

 sciousness unless there exist something which 

 is changed, and something which causes the 

 changes. There can be no impressions unless 

 there exist a something which is impressed and 

 a something which impresses. Take away from 

 the argument all the terms which relate to real 



' ^ Spencer, Principles of Psychology y vol. i. p. 209 [§ 88] ; 

 First Principles, pp. 93-96 [§ 26]. 

 126 



