PHENOMENON AND NOUMENQN 



of an Unknowable Reality, of which all phe- 

 nomena whatever are the knowable manifesta- 

 tions. 



With the statement of this conclusion, our 

 chapter properly ends. It is desirable, however, 

 that, before proceeding to consider the ques- 

 tions next in order, we should briefly sum up 

 the results at which we have already arrived. 

 By adding a little here and a little there, now 

 a definite outline and now a bit of shading, we 

 have gradually produced a rough sketch of a 

 general theory of things. The inquiry will pro- 

 ceed through future chapters, in the hope of 

 slowly converting this rough sketch into a more 

 or less finished picture ; but for the moment we 

 may advantageously take a step backward, and 

 contemplate, in a single view, the main charac- 

 teristics of our work. 



At the outset our philosophy was seen to be 

 characterized by the assertion that all knowledge 

 is relative, — an assertion which carried with 

 it the rejection of all ontological speculation, 

 whether metaphysical or theological, concerning 

 the nature of that which exists absolutely. But 

 in thus characterizing our philosophy we went 

 but halfway toward defining it. In order to 

 know thoroughly what anything is, we must also 

 know what it is not. Few philosophers, since 

 the seventeenth century, have rejected the doc- 



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