SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE METHODS 



ity than inductions from premises supplied by 

 sensible experiences ; and consequently, while 

 we are seeking to found philosophy in common- 

 sense — or in science, which is simply common- 

 sense rectified, extended, and methodized, — 

 Hegel, on the other hand, entertains no such 

 purpose. Philosophy, with him, lies quite out 

 of the range of common - sense, — which is 

 merely the organization of sensible experiences, 

 — and if there be conflict between the deliver- 

 ances of the two, it is common-sense that must 

 go to the wall. With this perfectly logical, 

 though practically absurd conclusion, we may 

 fitly compare Schelling's declaration that philo- 

 sophic truth is to be attained only through the 

 exercise of a faculty superior to reason ; which 

 faculty Schelling called " Intellectual Intuition.'* 

 This " was not supposed to be a faculty com- 

 mon to all men ; on the contrary, it was held 

 as the endowment only of a few of the privi- 

 leged : it was the faculty fdr philosophizing. 

 Schelling expresses his disdain for those who 

 talk about not comprehending the highest truths 

 of philosophy. ' Really,' he exclaims, ^ one sees 

 not wherefore Philosophy should pay any atten- 

 tion whatever to Incapacity. It is better rather 

 that we should isolate Philosophy from all 

 the ordinary routes, and keep it so separated 

 from ordinary knowledge that none of these 

 routes should lead to it. The highest truths of 



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