COSMIC PHILOSOPHY 



to account for. Its explanation will not be diffi- 

 cult if we look to the source from which our 

 notion of Power is derived. That source is the 

 peculiar class of states of consciousness which 

 accompany our voluntary actions. Part of our 

 notion of Power consists in our consciousness 

 of an ability to generate certain muscular se- 

 quences by means of an act of volition ; and 

 this amounts to no more than an expectation 

 that the antecedent, volition, will be followed 

 by the consequent, muscular movement. But 

 the other part of our notion of Power is derived 

 from the sense of effort which invariably accom- 

 panies our muscular actions. Every such action 

 " has to contend against resistance, either that 

 of an outward object or the mere friction and 

 weight of the moving organ ; every voluntary 

 motion is consequently attended by the muscu- 

 lar sensation of fatigue. Effort, considered as 

 an accompaniment of action upon the outward 

 world, means nothing to us but those muscular 

 sensations."^ Here, then, is the shape of our 

 primitive conception of Power; the conscious- 

 ness of volition, accompanied by the conscious 

 sensation of effort overcoming resistance, and the 

 conscious expectation of a consequent muscular 

 movement. Now, by the very relativity of our 

 thinking, as will be shown more fully in the next 



^ Mill, Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, vol- u. 

 p. 47. 



230 



