CAUSATION 



it is the sole efficient cause of all kinds of ac- 

 tions. Matter is absolutely inert : it is incon- 

 ceivable that matter should act upon matter, but 

 it is conceivable that mind should act upon 

 matter ; and therefore all phenomena which are 

 not the direct results of human or animal will 

 are the direct results of divine will. Such is 

 the so-called Volitional Theory of Causation. 



With the theistic implications of this d9C- 

 trine I shall deal in a future chapter. At pre- 

 sent we are concerned only with its psycho- 

 logical basis. And first we may observe that 

 those who assert the action of mind upon mat- 

 ter to be conceivable appear to have forgotten 

 the great difficulty under which metaphysics 

 laboured during the seventeenth century. To 

 Leibnitz and the Cartesians the action of mind 

 upon matter was the thing inconceivable above 

 all others, to account for which two theories 

 were framed, among the most remarkable in 

 the annals of metaphysics. These are, the doc- 

 trine of Occasional Causes, expounded by the 

 Cartesian Malebranche, and the doctrine of Pre- 

 established Harmony, expounded by Leibnitz, 

 who is said to have plagiarized it from Spinoza. 

 The Cartesians held it to be inconceivable, and 

 therefore (on the subjective method) impossible, 

 that thoughts or feelings in the mind should 

 produce movements in the body ; and conse- 

 quently they regarded the concurrence of mental 



