CAUSATION 



matter than we are directly cognizant of the ac- 

 tion of matter upon matter. " Our will causes 

 our bodily actions in the same sense (and in no 

 other) in which cold causes ice, or a spark 

 causes an explosion of gunpowder." The an- 

 tecedent, volition, and the subsequent, muscular 

 movement, are subjects of consciousness. But 

 the relation of invariable sequence between 

 them is known by experience, just as we know 

 any other relation of sequence. As Mr. Mill 

 observes, it cannot be admitted " that our con- 

 sciousness of the volition contains in itself any 

 a priori knowledge that the muscular motion 

 will follow. If our nerves of motion were par- 

 alyzed, or our muscles stiff and inflexible, and 

 had been so all our lives, there is no ground 

 for supposing that we should ever (unless by 

 information from other people) have known 

 anything of volition as a physical power, or been 

 conscious of any tendency in feelings of our 

 mind to produce motions of our body, or of 

 other bodies." ^ In such case we might still 

 have had a sensation, like that which we now 

 term the " consciousness of effort," but we 

 should have known it merely as " a feeling of 

 uneasiness, accompanying our feelings of de- 

 sire." As Sir William Hamilton acutely ob- 

 serves, the Volitional Theory " is refuted by 

 the consideration that between the overt act of 

 1 System of Logic, 6th edition, vol. i. p. 391. 



