COSMIC PHILOSOPHY 



tional invariable sequence was the doctrine of 

 Hume, Brown, and James Mill ; and for its 

 further defence and elucidation we are indebted, 

 not to Comte, but to John Stuart Mill. The 

 test of truth, as stated in the third chapter of 

 this work, was just as much or just as little pos- 

 tulated by Comte ay by preceding thinkers : it 

 was first definitely propounded by Mr. Spencer, 

 and its validity has been repeatedly challenged 

 by Mr. Mill, — the most eminent psychologist 

 who has yet declared his assent to all the funda- 

 mental doctrines of positivism. Nor was Comte 

 the first to insist upon the exclusive use of the 

 objective method in all departments of research ; 

 for Bacon, as we have seen, had enunciated this 

 precept with equal vigour and impressiveness, 

 though with less commanding scientific author- 

 ity. It is to be regretted, moreover, that we 

 cannot even accredit Comte with unflinching 

 loyalty to this principle. Not only have we 

 seen him openly disavowing it, but we have 

 been called upon to contemplate, in his " Subjec- 

 tive Synthesis," the most lamentable instance 

 afforded by history of the wonderful extent of ab- 

 erration possible to the intellectus sibi permissus. 

 All the above truths, then, so far as they were 

 understood by Comte, were accepted by him as 

 he found them. He did not originate them, 

 nor did he place them, from the psychological 

 point of view, upon any surer footing than they 

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