COSMIC PHILOSOPHY 



ent body of universal truth by Herbert Spen- 

 cer, it is clear that there exists a very considera- 

 ble body of philosophic doctrine, which is not 

 metaphysical or theological, and which, never- 

 theless, does not owe its existence to Comte. 

 It is clear that we cannot concede to Comte such 

 a monopoly of the scientific method of philo- 

 sophizing that all scientific philosophy must 

 be designated as Positivism. It does not yet 

 appear, from the foregoing summary, that sci- 

 entific philosophy owes anything whatever to 

 Comte. Yet if we were to rest in any such con- 

 clusion as this, we should be seriously in error. 

 It is not to be gainsaid that the speculations of 

 Comte have played a most conspicuous and 

 important part in directing the course of phi- 

 losophic inquiry in the nineteenth century. A 

 thinker of Comte's calibre does not live and 

 write to no purpose. And while it will appear, 

 in the course of the following discussion, that 

 the peculiar theories of Comte are such as phi- 

 losophy cannot possibly adopt, it will also ap- 

 pear that these theories, besides containing a 

 germ of truth, are instructive even in their erro- 

 neousness. Even while demonstrating that we 

 cannot, without grievously retrograding, con- 

 sider ourselves followers of Comte or advocates 

 of the Positive Philosophy, we must at the 

 same time freely admit our indebtedness to 

 Comte for sundry suggestions of the highest 

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