ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND COSMISM 



As Mr. Spencer wisely and wittily observes, 

 " Inquiring into the pedigree of an idea is not 

 a bad means of estimating its value." Comte's 

 conception of the evolution of philosophy 

 obliges us henceforth to test ideas by their 

 pedigree, — to trace their origin in the employ- 

 ment of the subjective or of the objective 

 method. Surely it was no small achievement 

 to bring together the truths which Locke and 

 Hume and others had laboriously detected, 

 and to exhibit them as the necessary outcome 

 of twenty-five centuries of speculative activity. 

 For by this proceeding the truths in question 

 were at least historically justified. And although 

 the psychological justification of them had to 

 be left for Mr. Spencer, although it can be 

 amply proved that Comte, in his ignorance of 

 psychology, seriously misinterpreted the import 

 of these truths, that is no reason why we should 

 hesitate to acknowledge the greatness of his 

 achievement. The doctrine of which Cuvier 

 was the most eminent upholder — the doctrine 

 of fixity of species — is one which modern bio- 

 logy rejects, just as modern philosophy rejects 

 the doctrines especially characteristic of Comte's 

 system. Nevertheless, as we admit of Cuvier, 

 — that his innovation, in studying all existing 

 organisms with reference to past organisms, 

 amounted to a revolution in the attitude of bio- 

 logy, — so we must admit of Comte, that his 

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