COSMISM AND POSITIVISM 



In this statement of the case, which once 

 seemed to me satisfactory, we have probably 

 the strongest argument that can be devised in 

 favour of the identification of Mr. Spencer's 

 philosophy with Positivism. Yet, — as above 

 hinted, and as will be self-evident to every one 

 who has comprehended the foregoing chapters, 

 — its apparent strength rests entirely upon the 

 verbal ambiguity of the five cardinal proposi- 

 tions, which are stated in such a way as to con- 

 ceal the real points at issue between the two 

 philosophies. With regard to the first two pro- 

 positions, I have already shown that they are in 

 nowise so peculiar to Comte that allegiance to 

 them should make us his disciples or coadju- 

 tors. In accepting the Doctrine of Relativity, as 

 well as in receiving from modern science the in- 

 heritance of the Objective Method, we are the 

 " heirs of all the ages," and are in nowise espe- 

 cially beholden to Comte. As regards the fifth 

 proposition, concerning the critical attitude of 

 philosophy, the discussion of it does not belong 

 to our Prolegomena but to our Corollaries, since 

 before we can comprehend it we must make sure 

 that we understand what is implied by the Doc- 

 trine of Evolution. In the concluding chapter 

 of this work it will appear that our dissent from 

 Positivism is practically no less emphatic in re- 

 spect to the critical attitude of philosophy than 

 in other respects. For the present we can will- 

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