COSMIC PHILOSOPHY 



treated. Let us consider what is implied by 

 the perception of an object. 



It is admitted on all sides that the perception 

 of an object necessarily implies the recognition 

 of the object as this or that, as like certain ob- 

 jects, and as unlike certain other objects. Every 

 act of perception, therefore, involves classifica- 

 tion. We cannot even name a chair without 

 implying the existence of a group of objects 

 which the chair resembles ; and the essential 

 element in the perception of a chair is not the 

 reception of a group of visual or tactual im- 

 pressions, but the interpretation of these im- 

 pressions as like other antecedent impressions 

 which, taken together, constitute the conscious- 

 ness of the presence of a chair. And this is 

 as much an act of classification as the act by 

 virtue of which the naturalist would rank a 

 newly found horned and cloven-hoofed mammal 

 among the ruminants ; the only difference being 

 that in ordinary perception the act has been per- 

 formed so frequently as to have become auto- 

 matic at an early period of life, while in scienti- 

 fic classification the act involves more or less 

 conscious thinking, and comparison of rela- 

 tions. 



Here, in this last clause, there is hinted what 

 we are seeking for. Not only in scientific clas- 

 sification, but in ordinary perception also, there 

 must go on a comparison of relations, and a 



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