THE COMPOSITION OF MIND 



sists solely in the heterogeneity and definite- 

 ness of the groups which are classified, and in 

 the extent to which the classifications are com- 

 pounded. 



To such a statement, however, there is one 

 essential qualification to be added. It is not 

 strictly correct to say that the classification in- 

 volved alike in the most complex act of reason- 

 ing and in the simplest act of perception is a 

 classification of groups of sensations and of the 

 relations between them. For when an object 

 is perceived, along with the sensations actually 

 present, there are remembered or internally 

 revived sensations which enter into the classi- 

 fication, and these internally revived sensations 

 are what we call ideas or images. For example, 

 " when passing the finger over a rough surface, 

 the perception contains very much more than 

 the coordinated sensations immediately experi- 

 enced. Along with these there go the remem- 

 bered visual impressions produced by such a 

 surface, which cannot be kept out of the mind, 

 and in the suggestion of which the perception 

 largely consists ; and there are automatic in- 

 ferences respecting the texture and density of 

 the substance." So when we see an orange 

 lying on the table, the only sensation actually 

 present and entering into the case is the sen- 

 sation of a patch of reddish-yellow colour sur- 

 rounded by other unlike patches of colour. 



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