THE COMPOSITION OF MIND 



lowest depths of the problem yet remain to 

 be sounded, as will be seen when we consider 

 a superficial objection not unfrequently urged 

 against the foregoing views. Alike in all the 

 mental operations which have formed the sub- 

 ject matter of our analysis, we have seen that 

 the relations of likeness and unlikeness entering 

 into the case are classified with certain other 

 relations of likeness and unlikeness previously 

 cognized. The thought which determines the 

 astronomer in calculating the moon's distance 

 implies previous experience of triangles and of 

 numerical relations. In the classification of a 

 giraffe there is implied previous acquaintance 

 with the complex relations of structure and 

 function connoted by the terms ruminant^ ungu- 

 late^ monodelphian, mammal, vertebrate, and ani- 

 mal. The perception of an apple implies nu- 

 merous antecedent experiences of colour, size, 

 configuration, smoothness, odour, and taste. 

 And in like manner, though we have provision- 

 ally defined a sensation as an " elementary state 

 of consciousness," yet we have also seen that, 

 in order to become truly conscious of a sensa- 

 tion, we must know it, or, in other words, must 

 classify it with some like sensation previously 

 felt. In short, we have seen that there can be 

 no cognition, of whatever order, which is not a 

 recognition, necessarily implying some previous 

 combination of psychical states. How then, it 



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