SOCIOLOGY AND FREE-WILL 



than to show that the evidence is against it. 

 Nevertheless beneath the emotional assertions 

 just quoted there lies a complicated theoretical 

 misconception, the character of which it is worth 

 our while to examine. The well-worn argument 

 is that unless the human will were " free," there 

 could be no responsibility, and therefore no mo- 

 rality ; that if volitions are caused, even though 

 it be by our own desires, we are all in a condi- 

 tion similar to that of the man who has made a 

 promise under duress, to whom neither praise 

 nor blame can justly be attached for the manner 

 in which his promise is kept. 



It is popularly supposed that there is some- 

 thing very forcible in this argument ; and that, 

 when coupled with the opposing arguments 

 drawn from such sequences as are easily trace- 

 able among human affairs, the result is a puz- 

 zle which must forever remain insoluble. The 

 problem of free-will has been described by poets, 

 and is customarily regarded, as the most difficult 

 problem which can occupy human attention ; 

 and we frequently hear it said that it can never 

 be completely solved. But in reality all this per- 

 plexity is the result of the desperate muddle 

 into which metaphysics has brought the subject. 

 Strip the question of the peculiar metaphysical 

 jargon in which it is usually propounded, restate 

 it in precise scientific language, and it becomes 

 a very easy question to answer. Would that 



