SOCIOLOGY AND FREE-WILL 



conveyed by every statement which, alluding to 

 the Will as an entity, ascribes " freedom " to 

 it. Only by means of such a conception can the 

 phrase " freedom of the Will " be shielded from 

 the imputation of nonsense. Only thus can the 

 argument above cited be regarded as relevant to 

 the subject in dispute. For if Will be not con- 

 ceived as an entity acting under conditions, then 

 no comparison can be made between caused vo- 

 lition and constrained behaviour. If instead of 

 "The Will" we look at the act of willing, — 

 which is not an entity, but a dynamic process, 

 — then it becomes absurd to talk of this act as 

 being either free or not free, and we must seek 

 for some other word than " freedom " by which 

 to designate its alleged want of causal connection 

 with preceding psychical states. 



Now the tendency to erect relations and pro- 

 cesses into entities is a tendency which modern 

 metaphysics has inherited from a mischievous 

 mode of thought current in ancient times and 

 rather loosely known as " Realism." Among 

 metaphysicians, unused to the habits of thought 

 which science nurtures, the tendency is an almost 

 irresistible one. Civilization, for example, is ob- 

 viously a process^ but Dr. Whately continually 

 speaks of it as if it were a thing which could 

 be handed about from one nation to another, 

 or hidden away for a time in some dark corner. 

 And upon this amusing misconception he builds a 



VOL. Ill ^57 



