COSMIC PHILOSOPHY 



ling me to act in one way, then it may be said, 

 intelligibly enough, that I have not liberty of 

 choice. But as between the different motives 

 of my own mind, there is no meaning in the use 

 of the word ' liberty.' Various motives — pre- 

 sent or prospective pleasures and pains — con- 

 cur in urging me to act. The result of the con- 

 flict shows that lone group is stronger than 

 another, and that is the whole case." ^ Or, as 

 M. Littre has still more forcibly reminded us, 

 the term " liberty," as applied to voYitioUy means 

 the power of obeying the strongest motive. 

 When that power is interfered with, by paraly- 

 sis or insanity, or the constraint exercised by 

 other persons, then we may truly say that we 

 are deprived of free-will and of responsibility. 

 But so long* as circumstances allow volition to 

 follow the strongest motive, then we truly say 

 that we are free and responsible for our actions. 

 Thus the tables are completely turned, and 

 much of the current disputation on this subject 

 is reduced at once to unmeaning verbiage. The 

 popular arguments in favour of " freedom " are 

 seen to be as palpable cases of ignoratio elenchi 

 as are those daily urged against the develop- 

 ment hypothesis. By a scientific definition of 

 Will, the assertion of freedom is set aside as 

 irrelevant, leaving behind the assertion of non- 

 causation. That this too is virtually disposed 

 ^ Bain, The Emotions and the Will, ist edition, p. 550. 

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