COSMIC PHILOSOPHY 



repression it is enfeebled, he applies this know- 

 ledge to the control of his will and the discipline 

 of his character. But on the theory that voli- 

 tions are causeless, all methods of self-discipline 

 become of no avail. If they are powerless to 

 influence action, it is of small practical impor- 

 tance whether noble and sympathetic or base 

 and selfish motives are prevalent ; and the moral 

 distinction between them loses most of its signi- 

 ficance. Why, asks Mr. Smith, " is a Philip II. 

 more the subject of moral disapprobation than 

 the plague? '* Why, indeed, unless his atrocious 

 crimes are to be interpreted as the necessary 

 outgrowth of a character wherein good motives 

 were impotent and bad motives all-powerful. 

 Were volition self-determining, then similar acts 

 might have been committed by a Washington 

 or a Borromeo. Obviously there would be little 

 use in laboriously schooling our desires to virtue, 

 if at any moment in spite thereof some uncaused 

 volition might bring forth from us a detestable 

 deed. It is therefore not the doctrine of causa- 

 tion, but the so-called free-will doctrine, that, 

 if true, would " put an end to self-exertion," 

 and deprive us of every " rule of right action." 

 Since self-control, and therefore liberty, Is im- 

 possible unless volition is determined by desire, 

 it is the latter doctrine — not the former — 

 which is really inconsistent with the assertion 

 of human freedom, which takes from us the 

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