COSMIC PHILOSOPHY 



need not be strengthened by the fear of pun- 

 ishment.^ 



Thus do all the favourite arguments in be- 

 half of the free-will hypothesis recoil upon its 

 defenders. To adopt from barbarian warfare 

 an ungraceful but expressive simile, they are like 

 awkwardly thrown boomerangs which wound 

 the thrower. Attempting, as the free-will philo- 

 sophers do, to destroy the science of history, 

 they are compelled by an inexorable logic to 

 pull down with it the cardinal principles of 

 ethics, politics, and jurisprudence. Political 

 economy, if rigidly dealt with on their theory, 

 would fare little better ; and psychology would 

 become chaotic jargon. That psychical actions, 



^ '* The very reason for giving notice that we intend to pun- 

 ish certain acts; and for inflicting punishment if the acts be 

 committed, is that we trust in the efficacy of the threat and 

 the punishment as deterring motives. If the volition of agents 

 be not influenced by motives, the whole machinery of law be- 

 comes unavailing, and punishment a purposeless infliction of 

 pain. In fact it is on that very ground that the madman is 

 exempted from punishment ; his volition being presumed to be 

 not capable of being acted upon by the deterring motive of 

 legal sanction. TYv^free agent, thus understood, is one who 

 can neither feel himself accountable, nor be rendered account- 

 able to or by others. It is only the necessary agent (the per- 

 son whose volitions are determined by motives, and, in case 

 of conflict, by the strongest desire or the strongest apprehen- 

 sion) that can be held really accountable, or can feel himself 

 to be so." Grote, Review of Mill' s Examination of Hamil- 

 ton's Philosophy, p. 97. 



274 



