GENESIS OF MAN, INTELLECTUALLY 



which are compared. In each case the process 

 is at bottom a grouping of objects and of rela- 

 tions according to their likenesses and unlike- 

 nesses. It was similarly shown that all know- 

 ledge is a classification of experiences, and that 

 every act of knowledge is an act of classification; 

 that an act of inference^ such as is involved in 

 simple cases of perception, is " the attributing 

 to a body, in consequence of some of its pro- 

 perties, all those properties by virtue of which 

 it is referred to a particular class ; " that the 

 " forming of a generalization is the putting to- 

 gether in one class all those cases which present 

 like relations ; " and that " the drawing a deduc- 

 tion is essentially the perception that a particular 

 case belongs to a certain class of cases previously 

 generalized. So that, as ordinary classification 

 is a grouping together of like things ; reasoning 

 is a grouping together of like relations among 

 things." ^ In this fundamental doctrine the two 

 different schools of modern psychology, repre- 

 sented respectively by Mr. Bain and Mr. Man- 

 sel, will thoroughly agree. But from this it in- 

 evitably follows that the highest and the lowest 

 manifestationsof intelligence consist respectively 

 of processes which differ only in heterogeneity 

 and definiteness and in the extent to which they 

 are compounded. 



^ Spencer's Essays, 1st series, p. 1 89 [Library Edition, vol. 

 "• P- 33] 5 see above. Part I. chap. ii. ; Part II. chap. xv. 



VOL. IV 6^ 



