GENESIS OF MAN, MORALLY 



the savage, — the dread, partly vague, partly 

 specific, associated with the idea of reproba- 

 tion, human and divine, and the sense of sat- 

 isfaction, partly vague, partly specific, associ- 

 ated with the idea of approbation, human and 

 divine." ^ But a sound ethical philosophy re- 

 gards it as degrading to perform good actions 

 or to refrain from performing bad actions merely 

 in order to win applause or to secure a place in 

 heaven. Something more is needed to complete 

 our account of the moral sense. 



Nevertheless the more perilous portions of 

 the labyrinth have been traversed, I hope with 

 safety, and we now need only one more clew to 

 bring us to the light. We shall best realize the 

 character of this additional element needed, if we 

 consider for a moment the most general aspects 

 of the two groups of feelings already described. 

 While the feelings of which we first treated 

 under the head of pleasures and pains are purely 

 egoistic or self-regarding feeling, on the other 

 hand the feelings which we have lately de- 

 scribed as underlying and forming the ground- 

 work of the moral sense in a state of sociality 

 have been happily characterized by Mr. Spencer 

 as " ego-altruistic '* feelings. That is, they con- 

 cern the happiness of the individual in so far as 

 it depends upon the feelings with which his 

 fellow creatures regard him. The mixed feeling 



^ Spencer, Principles of Psychology y vol. ii. p. 602. 



VOL. IV ^45 



