ANTHROPOMORPHIC THEISM 



nary statement is still more explicitly revealed 

 in the assertion that " heat is like steam, as be- 

 ing both physical objects." So, then, we get 

 some conception of the kind of science with 

 which anthropomorphism is practically compati- 

 ble. Heat, it seems, is a physical object in a 

 state of molecular agitation ! ! The ordinary 

 physicist will certainly object that heat, being 

 the state of molecular agitation, can hardly be 

 called, with propriety, the physical object. And 

 the logician will add that, even if it could be 

 so called, an argument would hardly be thought 

 convincing which should rest upon the alleged 

 resemblance of a billiard-table to a rhinoceros 

 — yet these are both physical objects. Mr. 

 Adam is equally unhappy in his answer to Mr. 

 Mill's humorous criticism of Descartes. Paro- 

 dying the celebrated maxim, — Si enim ponamus 

 aliquid in idea reperiri quod non fuerit in ejus 

 causa, hoc igitur habet a nihilo, — Mr. Mill ob- 

 serves that " if there be pepper in the soup, 

 there must be pepper in the cook who made it, 

 since otherwise the pepper would be without a 

 cause." Mr. Adam's reply savours strongly of 

 mediaeval realism. The cook, he says, is not 

 indeed the efficient cause of the pepper, but 

 the cook's intelligence is the efficient cause of 

 the intelligence displayed in the mixture of the 

 ingredients of the soup — so that even here the 

 cause is like the effect ! Comment is not needed. 



