ANTHROPOMORPHIC THEISM 



separate series, or in other words, that there are 

 no causal relations between the members of one 

 series and the members of another. A single 

 instance of causal relation between a material 

 event and an intellectual or emotional event — 

 such as the relation between certain atmospheric 

 undulations communicated from vioUn strings 

 to the auditory nerve, and the consequent re- 

 cognition of the triad of A-minor, with the 

 accompanying pleasurable feeling — is fatal to 

 the argument. Waiving this objection, however, 

 and for the moment admitting that the universe, 

 as containing intellectual and moral phenomena, 

 requires an intellectual and moral Cause, we 

 may note that the argument proves altogether 

 too much. Since the universe contains material, 

 as well as psychical phenomena, its First Cause, 

 according to Mr. Adam's argument, must par- 

 take of all the differential qualities of those 

 phenomena. If it reasons and wills, like the 

 higher animals, it must also, like minerals, plants, 

 and the lowest animals, be unintelligent and un- 

 endowed with the power of volition, — which 

 requires in the First Cause a more than Hege- 

 lian capacity for uniting contradictory attributes. 

 Else we must suppose its causal action to be 

 confined to man, and those other animals which 

 manifest intelligence and volition, while the rest 

 of the universe either seeks another First Cause, 

 or goes without on^ All these are aUke con- 

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