152 



NATURE 



[April 13, 1916 



indirectly, to the institution, namely, "What is re- 

 search?" The answer to this question is contained in 

 the answer to the larger question, " What is science? " ; 

 for the methods of research are the methods of science. 

 The meaning of this much used and much misused 

 term is now well defined. It was established during 

 the last half of the nineteenth century, although in 

 common parlance it may still mean anything from 

 " skill in boxing " to the prediction of solar and lunar 

 eclipses. 



In a summary way science presents itself under 

 three distinct stages, to wit :— (i) The elementary stage 

 of observation and experiment, or the fact-gattiering 

 stage; (2) the secondary stage of comparison, measure- 

 ment, and calculation, or the statistical stage; (3) the 

 stage of correlation under theory with capacity for 

 prediction. But within the limits of these distinct 

 stages there is endless diversity of detail, and hence 

 the widest latitude for amateurism, dilettantism, and 

 even pseudo-science. Thus it happens not infrequently 

 that inquiry is made whether the institution undertakes 

 any other than '"scientific investigations," whether its 

 work is limited to science, or whether it seeks to enter the 

 domains of philosophy, metaphysics, etc. Concerning 

 these matters, the attitude of the institution is at once 

 liberal and critical, liberal in recognising all branches 

 of demonstrable knowledge, and critical in respect to 

 all unverified and unverifiable representations. No 

 attempt has been made to limit recognition to the 

 domain of mathematico-physical science or to the quite 

 unhappily designated domain of "'natural science." 



It would be rash to assert that the methods and 

 the inductions of science, which have cost more than 

 twenty centuries of laborious effort in their evolution, 

 are not still susceptible of many or even endless im- 

 provements. But these methods are now so well 

 defined and so well known by all acquainted with the 

 history of human progress that it is no longer essential 

 to use the adjective " scientific " in qualification of the 

 words investigation and research. One may safely 

 assume, for administrative purposes at any rate, that 

 investigations which purport to be unscientific or super- 

 scientific do not fall within the scope of a research 

 organisation. And in conformity with this view the 

 term science may be no longer limited advantageously 

 to designation of the mathematico-physical sciences 

 (including the biological and the so-called natural 

 sciences), which for certain obvious reasons have thus 

 far helped most to fix its meaning. 



But while the term science should be interpreted 

 in the most comprehensive and liberal manner, experi- 

 ence teaches that its criteria should be strictly ob- 

 served and impartially applied. Liberality of inclu- 

 sion and consideration may not be construed as imply- 

 ing leniency of judgment in matters scientific. Science 

 furnishes no royal road to learning. It will under- 

 take to blaze trails, to set up constructions conformable 

 to the laws of the universe, and to test ideas, hypo- 

 theses, and theories ; but it is unable to work in 

 regions from which its methods and criteria are 

 excluded. 



The most striking characteristic of the institution 

 is found in its departments of research. These are 

 absorbing the bulk of the institution's income. They 

 are devoted to fields of inquiry in which continuity 

 of effort over long periods of time is a prime requisite. 

 Their problems, like many of the phenomena under 

 investigation, are of a secular nature and their pro- 

 gress mav not be measured adequately in terms of an 

 interval shorter than a decade. They are centres of 

 activity which, if properly sustained, should continue 

 to contribute additions to knowledge the fuller fruition 

 of which can be appreciated only by our successors. 



The questions most frequently raised with respect to 

 these departments are: — (i) "What practical results 



NO. 2424, VOL. 97] 



are expected from them?" (2) "Assuming them 

 attainable, will the expected results justify the costs 

 entailed?"; (3) "When will the work of any depart- 

 ment be completed?" 



(i) An essential preliminary in answering the first 

 question is removal of the obscurity which commonly 

 attaches to the word "practical." Those who use 

 this word freely are rarely competent judges of re- 

 search or of the accessions to learning secured thereby. 

 What is practical to them is usually confined within 

 the limits of personal experience instead of being 

 permitted to fall within the far wider limits of the 

 exp>erience of our race. He who would venture an 

 off-hand opinion concerning the practical, or directly 

 realisable utilitarian, value of any proposed investiga- 

 tion must needs be uncommonly wise or possess a 

 temerity not derived from an acquaintance with the 

 history of science. This history demonstrates in the 

 clearest nianner that every established fact, every 

 newly-discovered principle, and every generalisation 

 from fact and principle are sooner or later turned to 

 advantageous account. Moreover, this induction from 

 history is now so well established that a research 

 organisation as such should never concern itself seri- 

 ously with the question whether a proposed investiga- 

 tion will turn out to be of immediate utility. The 

 question it should ask is: "Whether it is now prac- 

 ticable to undertake the proposed work and do it 

 thoroughly well?" If this is decided in the affirma- 

 tive, the organisation may proceed with equanimity, 

 confident of the final, even if doubtful of the contem- 

 porary, verdict. 



On the other hand, while holding to the views just 

 indicated, it is not necessary to ignore equally impor- 

 tant items of mundane wisdom. It needs to be kept 

 in mind that not all worthy subjects of research are 

 at any epoch co-ordinately practicable of pursuit. In 

 fact, there may be enterprises quite unready for in- 

 vestigation by a given organisation at a given time, 

 and other enterprises which under existing conditions 

 would result only in a waste of energy and resources. 



(2) In answer to the second question it may be 

 said that while there is inherently an element of un- 

 certainty in respect to the comparability of returns 

 with outlay in the conduct of research, this uncertainty 

 is in general much less than in most unexplored fields 

 for investment of effort and capital. Systematic 

 research is quite certain to secure some advances; 

 even negative results are often of great value; and 

 the elimination of error is almost as important as the 

 discovery of truth. Here, again, appreciation of the 

 time element is essential. A just verdict cannot be 

 rendered by our contemporaries ; it must be left to 

 posterity. Progress is not so much for the individual as 

 for the race. It should be observed, also, that the costs 

 of progress attributable to deliberate investigation 

 have been, and are still, vanishingly small in com- 

 parison wiih the costs of the less contemplative forms 

 of human endeavour. But who shall say that the 

 permanent returns from these two contrasted realms of 

 social effort are not more nearly inversely than directly 

 proportional to the respective outlays ? 



The appalling events now absorbing the world's 

 attention are painfully instructive in seeming to prove 

 that in some of his efforts to understand the cosmos 

 wherein he appears to play a unique rdle man has met 

 with little or no success during the past twenty 

 centuries; on the other hand, during the same interval, 

 his efforts along scientific lines to interpret that cosmos 

 have been rewarded by extraordinary advances, the 

 aggregate of which constitutes the bulk of the learn- 

 ing we may pass on unreservedly to our 

 successors. The superiority of the learning «• 

 to-day over that of the first centuries of our 

 era is indicated, for example, in the difference be- 



