Can We Protect Our Coasts? 



On the Atlantic seaboard a hostile army of 

 400,000 could land at 116 undefended points 



w 



'E have, approximately, five thou- 

 sand miles of coast line, about 

 three hundred miles of which are 

 now protected by twenty-nine coast de- 

 fenses. Military men regard the navy as 

 the first line of defense, coast defenses as the 

 second line, and the army as the third. 



But no matter how strong a coast defense 

 may be, if it cannot repel land attack as well 

 as sea attack it is practically useless. Thus 

 big guns are not alone sufficient ; there must 

 be a land force and small arms. The latest 

 official estimate places the number of 

 coast artillery at 508 officers and n 

 men. Obviously, this is far less thai 

 should be. Furthermore, our guns are 

 for the most part old models, hope- 

 lessly outdistanced by the powerful 

 fifteen-inch guns of such ships as the 

 Queen Elizabeth, 

 So, when Gen- 

 eral Wood s 

 that an enemy 

 fleet could lie 



The stars indicate the positions of forts 

 along the Atlantic Coast. There are 

 no less than 116 undefended points 



Rockaway and throw shells into Four- 

 teenth Street, New York, we have to 

 swallow hard and admit he's right. c^Kx^ 

 However, his statement is short-lived. 

 The Government is now building a fortifica- 

 tion at Far Rockaway, which, it is hoped, 

 will protect New York from danger. But 

 as regards Chesapeake Bay, one of our 

 vulnerable points, nothing has'been done to 

 protect it from the danger of foreign inva- 

 sion beyond the placing of submarine nets. 

 So small was the supply of coast defense 

 ammunition in 1915 that it would be 

 exhausted in forty-five minutes by a 

 capacity fire of our coast defense guns. If 



the firing were done b\ 

 howitzers, the ammunition 

 would last about thirty 

 minutes. Fortunately, this 

 situation is no 

 longer true, 

 due to a re- 

 awa 



kening 

 of t he 

 author- 

 ities at 

 Wash- 

 ington to the 

 real state of 

 afTairs. Our am- 

 munition supply has 

 steadily increased since 

 915. But it must still 

 far behind the needs 

 of the hour. 



Our own army offi- 

 cers have pointed out 

 to us that 400,000 men 

 could easily be landed on 

 the Atlantic Coast. A system 

 of heavy guns permanently 

 \y^ mounted on railway carriages — 

 mobile forts, in other words — has 

 been suggested as a means of protect- 

 ing our coast area and inland cities. 

 They might prove useful, when it is 

 considered that there are no less than 

 oiie hundred and sixteen undefended 

 points where an enemy could place 

 troops. These statements 

 are alarming. About the 

 only redeeming feature of 

 our situation is to be found 

 in our railroads. We have 

 a valuable net of railroads 

 which could transport troops quickly. 



In spite of tlie despairing predictions 

 made by our military authorities, one of 

 which is that it will be years before our 

 coast defenses and mobile army can be 

 developed into real fighting units-, there 

 is the hope that some agency — motor 

 torpedo boats, coast submarines, mobile 

 forts, or whatnot — may back up our coast 

 fortifications and afford our coast line the 

 protection it needs. 



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543 



