xi.l PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTIVE INFERENCE. 227 



effect, and may thence deductively ascertain the proba- 

 bility that the next alloy examined will fuse at a lovA'er 

 temperature than its constituents. It has been asserted, 

 indeed, by ]\Iill,^ and partially admitted by Mr. Fowler,^ 

 that we can argue du'ectly from case to case, so that what 

 is true of some alloys will be true of the next. Professor 

 Baiu has adopted the same view of reasoning. He thinks 

 that Mill has extricated us from the dead lock of the 

 syllogism and effected a total revolution in logic. He 

 holds that reasoning from particulars to particulars is not 

 only the usual, the most obvious and the most ready 

 method, but that it is the type of reasoning which best 

 discloses the real process.^ Doubtless, this is the usual 

 result of our reasoning, regard being had to degrees ot 

 probability ; but these logicians fail entirely to give any 

 explanation of the process by which we get from case 

 to case. 



It may be allowed that the knowledge of future par- 

 ticular events is the main purpose of our investigations, 

 and if there were any process of thought by which we 

 could pass directly from event to event without ascending 

 into general truths, this method would be sufficient, and 

 certainly the briefest. It is true, also, that the laws of 

 mental association lead the mind always to expect the like 

 again in apparently like circumstances, and even animals 

 of very low intelligence must have some trace of such 

 powers of association, serving to guide them more or less 

 correctly, in the absence of true reasoning faculties. But 

 it is the purpose of logic, according to Mill, to ascertain 

 whetiier inferences have been correctly drawn, rather than 

 to discover them.* Even if we can, then, by habit, 

 association, or any rude process of inference, infer the 

 future directly from the past, it is the work of logic to 

 analyse the conditions on which the correctness of this 

 inference depends. Even Mill would admit that such 

 analysis involves the consideration of general truths,^ and 



' System of Logic, bk. II. chap. iii. 



2 Inductive IjOffir, pp. 13, 14. 



' Bain, Deductive Logic, p]). 208, 209. 



* System of Logic. Introduction, § 4. Fifth ed. pp. 8. 9. 



' Ibid. bk. II. chap. iii. § 5, pp. 225, &c, 



Q 2 



