ANIMAL BATIOCINATION 31 



that some of the higher animals may show the beginnings 

 of conceptual inference or of rational activity. From an 

 evolutionist point of view, this seems highly probable." 



This view from a great thinker and one of, if not the 

 most distinguished of modern men of science, puts a pre- 

 mium upon the interest of these letters. Are any of these 

 examples of animal sagacity, of dogs adapting means to 

 visualized ends, examples of conceptual inference? And 

 how many men and women do the readers of these letters 

 know whose lives are rationally governed by conceptual 

 ideals ? 



The great difficulty of the problem is the proper defini- 

 tion of " reason." Keason implies a perception of rela- 

 tions, generalizing the results of it into an abstract concept ; 

 it puts the how, the why, and the what. Whether or no 

 some animals possess this power of transmutation it is as 

 yet impossible to say, but on the affirmative side we have 

 to remember (1) the continuity of evolution, and (2) that 

 it is not easy to distinguish between a highly specialized 

 delicacy of sensory endowment, superior to the human 

 equivalent and possessed by most wild animals, and a 

 rudimentary capacity for rational behaviour. 



VI 



Having been limited in respect both of time and space 

 when I wrote my letter on animal reason (Spectator, 

 June 12), I hope that I may here insert, with slight 

 abridgements, a few more illustrations witnessed or quoted 

 by Romanes : 



" Snails appear susceptible of some degree of personal 

 attachment : an accurate observer informs me that he 

 placed a pair of land snails, one of which was weakly, in 

 a small and ill-provided garden. After a short time the 

 strong and healthy individual disappeared, and was traced 

 by its track of slime over a wall into an adjoining well- 



