V* THE PERIOD FROM 1878 TO 1891 63 



^" might prescribe for the protection of the timber, "and for other 

 purposes." 



Considerable litigation soon arose concerning the meaning of the 

 phrase, "all other mineral districts of the United States," certain 

 mining companies in Oregon and California claiming that this phrase 

 extended the provisions of the act to mining districts anywhere in the 

 United States. Secretary of the Interior Teller ruled that mineral 

 districts anywhere were included within the provisions of the act, but 

 the courts held that, while the phrase was some evidence of an inten- 

 tion on the part of Congress to extend the operation of the act beyond 

 the limits of the states and territories named, yet, since there was 

 nowhere any district known as a "mineral district," nor any method 

 known to the law by which such a district could be established, the 

 provisions of the law could not be so extended.^ 



The law was not only ambiguous but, strictly interpreted, would 

 have applied to a very small portion of the public timber lands.* It 

 permitted the removal of timber from mineral lands. Perhaps not one 

 acre in 5000, in the states and territories named, was mineral, and 

 hardly more than one acre in 5000 of what was mineral was known to 

 be such." The lands must be mineral, and furthermore, "not subject 

 to entry under existing laws of the United States except for mineral 

 entry." Interpreting this, the Supreme Court of the United States 

 held that in order that mineral lands should be excepted from pre- 

 emption and settlement, "the mineral must be in sufficient quantity to 

 add to their richness and to justify expenditure for its extraction, 

 and known to he so"^ In a later decision of the Supreme Court, Justice 

 Peckham said : "The right to cut is exceptional and narrow. . . . The 

 broad general rule is against the right. The presumption in the 

 absence of evidence is that the cutting is illegal."^ 



These decisions were made later than the period under considera- 

 tion, so, of course, were not yet binding, but they differed little from 



3 "Land Decisions," I, 600: U. S. vs. Smith; 11 Fed. Rep., 487; U. S. vs. Benja- 

 min; 21 Fed. Rep., 285. 



4 Report, Sec. of Int., 1878, XIII. 



5 Donaldson, "Public Domain," 543. 

 « Davis vs. Weibold; 139 U. S., 507, 519. 

 7 No. Pac. R. R. Co. vs. Lewis; 162 U. S., 366, 376. See also U. S. vs. Reed; 12 



Sawyer, 99, 104; and U. S. vs. Plowman; 216 U. S., 372. 



