14 WHAT IS SCIENCE? 



inquiry leads to another, and a new line of inquiry is 

 often assigned to the science that was the particular 

 study of the first investigator of that line, without 

 discussion whether the allocation can be justified on any 

 formal principle. 



^Such considerations clearly justify the view that 

 science is a single whole and that the divisions between 

 its branches are largely conventional and devoid of 

 ulterior significance. But, though science may be really 

 one, its range and complexity to-day is so great that 

 the most learned of mankind cannot profess to a serious 

 knowledge of any but a very small part of it. And 

 therefore perhaps I ought to justify and explain my 

 temerity in writing of science in general. I should point 

 out that physics is the only science of which I profess 

 an expert's knowledge, and that the discussion is bound 

 to be directed from the standpoint of a student of that 

 science. But it is generally admitted that physics is in 

 some sense more fundamental than any other science, 

 and that the results of physics constitute, in some sense, 

 the starting point of other sciences. Why there should 

 be that relation is a matter for subsequent inquiry ; but 

 the admitted fact of the relation makes it certain that, 

 if we decide what is physics, what is its fundamental 

 subject-matter and its method of dealing with it, we 

 shall have gone a long way towards answering similar 

 questions which may be raised concerning any other 

 branch of science. 



However, there is one question which should be roted 

 here. The examples of the various sciences that have 

 been given include none of the studies that lie on the 

 border line. Every one is prepared to grant that botany 

 and chemistry and physics are properly called sciences, 

 though there may be some doubt exactly what they Lave 

 in common ; but there are two studies of wide interest 

 the claims of which to be sciences are not universally 



