CHAPTER III 

 THE LAWS OF SCIENCE 



WHY DOES SCIENCE STUDY LAWS ? 



/HT^HERE was quoted on p. 28 an example of an 

 experience which could not be the subject-matter 



-*- of science, according to our definition, because 

 there could not be universal agreement about it. A 

 book fell on the floor when only one person was in a 

 position to observe the fall. Now it may be urged that 

 this example is typical, not of a small and peculiar class 

 of events occurring in the external world of nature and 

 perceived by the senses, but of all such events. No event 

 whatever has been observed by more than a very small 

 minority of mankind, even if we include only persons who 

 are all alive at the same time ; if we include and our 

 definition suggests that we ought to include all men, 

 past, present, and future, it is still more obvious that there 

 can be no event concerning which they can all agree ; for 

 there is no event which they can all perceive. Are we 

 then to take the view that no event whatever is the proper 

 subject-matter for science ? And, if we take that view, 

 what is there left in the external world which can properly 

 be such subject-matter ? 



The answer is that we are to exclude every particular 

 event from the subject-matter of science. It is here that 

 science is distinguished from history ; Justory _studies 

 particular events, but science does not. "What then does 

 does science study ? {jSgience studies certain relations 

 between particular events?] It may be possible for every 

 one to observe two events each of a particular kind, and 

 to judge that there is some relation between those events ; 

 although the particular events of that kind which they 



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