6 HISTORY OF INDUCTIVE SCIENCES. 



that justice cannot be done to the subject without 

 such a division of it. 



To this future work, then, I must refer the 

 reader who is disposed to require, at the outset, a 

 precise explanation of the terms which occur in my 

 title. It is not possible, without entering into this 

 philosophy, to explain adequately how science which 

 is INDUCTIVE differs from that which is not so ; or 

 why some portions of knowledge may properly be 

 selected from the general mass and termed SCIENCE. 

 It will be sufficient at present to say, that the sci- 

 ences of which we have here to treat, are those 

 which are commonly known as the Physical Sci- 

 ences ; and that by Induction is to be understood 

 that process of collecting general truths from the 

 examination of particular facts, by which such sci- 

 ences have been formed. 



There are, however, two or three remarks, of 

 which the application will occur so frequently, and 

 will tend so much to give us a clearer view of some 

 of the subjects which occur in our history, that 

 I will state them now in a brief and general 

 manner (A). 



Facts and Ideas. In the first place, then, I 

 remark, that, to the formation of science, two things 

 are requisite; Facts and Ideas; observation of 

 Things without, and an inward effort of Thought; 

 or, in other words, Sense and Reason. Neither of 

 these elements, by itself, can constitute substantial 

 general knowledge. The impressions of sense, un- 



