18 HISTORY OF INDUCTIVE SCIENCES. 



brings to light the difference of common Notions 

 and scientific Ideas, of which we have spoken. The 

 mind analyzes such Notions, reasons upon them, 

 combines and connects them; for it feels assured 

 that intellectual things ought to be able to bear 

 such handling. Even practical knowledge, we see 

 clearly, is not possible without the use of the reason ; 

 and the speculative reason is only the reason satis- 

 fying itself of its own consistency. This speculative 

 faculty cannot be controlled from acting. The mind 

 cannot but claim a right to speculate concerning 

 all its own acts and creations ; yet, when it exercises 

 this right upon its common practical notions, we 

 find that it runs into barren abstractions and ever- 

 recurring cycles of subtlety. Such Notions are like 

 waters naturally stagnant; however much we urge 

 and agitate them, they only revolve in stationary 

 whirlpools. But the mind is capable of acquiring 

 scientific Ideas, which are fitted to undergo this 

 discussion and impulsion. When our speculations 

 are duly fed from the spring-heads of observation, 

 and frequently drawn off into the region of applied 

 science, we may have a living stream of consistent 

 and progressive knowledge. That science may be 

 both real as to its import, and logical as to its 

 form, the examples of many existing sciences suffi- 

 ciently prove. 



School Philosophy. So long, however, as at- 

 tempts are made to form sciences, without such 

 a verification and realization of their fundamental 



