ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS. XXVII 



PAGE 



Appendix. Freedom and Necessity . . . . 459 



§ I. The difficulty as usually stated insoluble, as (§ 2) 

 both terms have several senses. § 3. The difficulty 

 really one about the nature, not of the will, but of caus- 

 ation. § 4. This shown by fact tliat both determinists 

 and libertarians ultimately arrive at indeterminism. § 5. 

 But the question has been wrongly put, for to explain 

 the will by causation is to explain the prototype by the 

 derivative. The assumptions made. § 6. Causation 

 and necessity strictly applicable only to the will. Neces- 

 sity should mean the feeling of compulsion, § 7, when, 

 like Freedom, it would be a psychological fact. Free- 

 dom and Necessity as correlative, and both abnormal. 

 § 8. For the maximum consciousness of either involves 

 an unhealthy mental condition, while thorough degrad- 

 ation is unconscious of either necessity or freedom. 

 § 9. This is the condition of inanimate nature, the Be- 

 coming of which is neither necessary nor free. But we 

 read causal necessity into what simply happens. § 10. 

 But as there is a state beneath morality and freedom, 

 so there is one which transcends the consciousness of a 

 freedom and necessity, viz., perfect wisdom and perfect 

 virtue. So both necessity and freedom are defects of a 

 nature only partly rational, and would vanish together 

 in perfection, i.e.^ at the end of the world-process. 



