POSITIVISM. 7 



ions, which ought to have been established by 

 philosophy, but which were left at the mercy of 

 every chance objection. Hence science, starting 

 without criticism from the metaphysical assumptions 

 of ordinary life, has never been able to give an 

 answer to ultimate questions that could appear ad- 

 equate to those that had the least perception of the 

 real point of the difficulty; and many of the scientists 

 themselves have been wise enough to admit this 

 limitation of their subject. And so, being conscious 

 of their limits, they deprecated any inquiry which 

 transcended them. 



§ 3. As the net result of these influences, there 

 has arisen a " positive " frame of mind, which con- 

 fines itself within the limited horizon and grey tones 

 of the known, and renounces all ulterior and ultimate 

 inquiries. And so long as this positivism aims at 

 nothing beyond the production of a state of feeling, 

 we cannot but applaud its tendency to a wise limitat- 

 ion of our aims, and admire the enviable happiness 

 of lives that present no problems which the known 

 data cannot solve, no desires which the known facts 

 cannot satisfy, no restlessness of discontent which 

 drives them beyond the phenomenal. But when it 

 attempts to raise a most serviceable but rare temper 

 of mind into a dogmatic injunction, and to assert as 

 a universal fact that philosophy is irrelevant to 

 practice, that things as they are can and ought to 

 content us all, that the practical life can be lived 

 without reference to ulterior theories, it is necessary 

 to join issue. 



§ 4. Can the practical life really be lived without 

 answering the theoretical questions of philosophy ? 

 Are the riddles of the Sphinx the idle pastime of 

 deluded fancy ? Does the wise man turn his back 



