ITS TWO KINDS. I 7 



ific and Kant of epistemological Agnosticism. 

 And since somewhat different objections apply to 

 each, it will be well to consider first the arguments 

 against Agnosticism generally, before dealing with 

 the special pleas of its chief exponents. And thus 

 the exposure of the flaws involved in all forms of 

 Agnosticism will finally drive it to seek refuge with 

 Scepticism. 



§ 2. The first objection which may be made to 

 every form of Agnosticism is, that it is impossible 

 on practical grounds. It supposes that we can take 

 up a position of suspense of judgment, based on 

 a theoretical recognition of their unknowableness, 

 with regard to the great principles which underlie 

 the practical life, and need neither affirm nor deny 

 them in action. This is really a re-assertion of the 

 positivist plea that they were immaterial to practice, 

 without the excuse positivism had in its ignorance 

 of their importance. But such suspense of judg- 

 ment is quite impossible. If we were purely think- 

 ing beings, it would obviously be the right attitude 

 towards matters not known. But as we have also 

 to act, and as action requires practical certainty, we 

 must make up our minds in one way or the other, 

 and our acts must belie the professions of our 

 theory. No agnostic can live for ^\^ minutes 

 without indulging in acts involving a belief or dis- 

 [belief in some of the unknowables he had solemnly 

 forsworn. Questions such as the existence of God 

 .nd the future of the soul cannot be treated as 

 [practically indifferent ; and the life, if not the theory, 

 of the agnostic must practically answer them in 

 some way or other. Just as men arrange their 

 [lives differently according as they believe them- 

 selves to have one year more to live or fifty, ac- 

 R ofS. (2: 



