26 AGNOSTICISM. 



And if such consequences of his doctrine do not 

 convince the agnostic that an unknowable, which Is 

 truly unknowable, truly out of relation to the known, 

 is nothing, nothing ever will. 



§ 7. The Inherent contradictions of the agnostic 

 position generally having been exposed. It becomes 

 necessary to point out the flaws In the special argu- 

 ments of Mr. Spencer and of Kant, and to detect 

 the weak points In the " antinomies " in which they 

 have sought to enmesh the human reason. 



Spencer's positive arguments in favour of the 

 assumption of an unknowable, if indeed they should 

 be called arguments rather than metaphors drawn 

 from a mistaken comparison of knowledge and 

 Space, have been already, to a considerable extent, 

 dealt with. 



It is not true that science Is " a gradually 

 increasing sphere in which every addition to its 

 surface brings us into wider contact with surround- 

 ing nescience." Neither Is it true that '' at the 

 uttermost reach of discovery there arises, and must 

 continue to arise, the question — What lies beyond ? " 

 or that* 'we cannot conceive any explanation pro- 

 found enough to exclude the question — What Is the 

 explanation of that explanation ? " 



It is indeed true that *' positive knowledge does 

 not, and cannot, fill the whole region of possible 

 knov/ledge," if under ''possible knowledge" we In- 

 clude, as Mr. Spencer apparently wishes us to 

 include, every casual question of fools and madmen. 

 But no sane thought will argue on possibilities that 

 everything might have been different from what It 

 Is, or trouble itself to consider the consequences of 

 such absurd assumptions, nor will it seek an explan- 

 ation of the self-evident, nor, when It has reached 



