30 AGNOSTICISM. 



self-existence and causation, on the other hand, 

 deserves closer attention. 



He rightly says that we mz^s^ 2issume self-existence 

 somewhere, and infers that we may as well assume 

 it of the world as of a transcendent deity and cause 

 of the world. Nothing is gained by accounting for 

 the world by a self-existing God ; we have merely 

 needlessly multiplied entities. And either theory is 

 equally unable to satisfy our demand for a zaAy : 

 we can as little tell wky God should exist as why 

 the world should : we must seek a cause of the 

 existence of God just as of the world. 



It will be seen from this that Mr. Spencer admits 

 that we are prima facie entitled to ask the why 

 of the world and the cause of its existence, but 

 considers our demand futile, because the same de- 

 mand may be renewed upon any answer we may 

 get. It will be necessary, therefore, for any one 

 asserting the self-existence of God, while denying 

 that of the world, to make a distinction between 

 their cases, which will justify their different treat- 

 ment. 



And it is not perhaps so difficult to make such 

 a distinction as it might at first appear. It was 

 shown above (§5) that our thought does not possess 

 a futile craving after infinite explanations, but that 

 its inquiries must in every case be suggested and 

 provoked by something outside it. The impetus to 

 thought is given by the discordant aspects of facts. 

 We do not ask the why of a fact, unless the fact is 

 so constituted as to provoke us to this question. 

 If, therefore, we raise the question of the why of 

 the world, this is not due to some gratuitous vagary 

 of our thought, but to the fact that the world is so 

 constituted as irresistibly to raise this question. 



