IS A FIRST CAUSE CONCEIVABLE ? 33 



God Is conceived as in a state of '' Being," and even 

 when not regarded as perfectly unchanging, He has 

 attributed to Him at least that amount of permanence 

 or Being which is implied in self-identity. We find, 

 therefore, that when we inquire, not into existence 

 in general, but only into that special portion of it 

 which constitutes our world, a self-existent God 

 may explain it in a way in which it could never 

 explain itself. 



§ 10. And a similar solution may be given to 

 the parallel difficulty concerning the cause of the 

 First Cause. Mr. Spencer urges that the assumpt- 

 ion of a first cause is futile, because we must con- 

 tinue to ask for further causes of the first cause ad 

 infinitum, and somewhat unjustly regards -the diffic- 

 ulty as one in the * metaphysical ' conception of a 

 first cause instead of In the * scientific ' conception of 

 causation generally. And yet the conception of a 

 first cause represents only an attempt to escape from 

 the difficulty of the infinite regress which Is Inherent 

 in every form of causation. Whatever, therefore, it 

 proves, is proved against the use of the conception 

 of causation generally, i.e., the drift of the argument 

 is sceptical and not agnostic. And, as a matter of 

 fact, a First Cause, if the meaning of the term Is 

 properly limited, is open to rather less objection 

 than an ordinary cause. If it is taken as an absolute 

 First Cause of all things, it Is indeed unthinkable, 

 whereas a relative first cause of our phenomenal 

 world may turn out a conception both valid and 

 useful. 



An absolute First Cause of the universe as such 

 (aTrXw?), Is absurd, because it is a supposition which 

 would explain nothing, and would only contradict 

 itself. It could not explain the Becoming or cause 



R. ofS. D 



