EVOLUTION V. EPISTEMOLOGY. 39 



It would be more to the purpose if, Instead of 

 attacking others, epistemology looked to Itself, — if, 

 instead of Interfering with metaphysics and psy- 

 chology, It raised its own stock question about it- 

 self and considered ' how,' if at all, ' epistemology 

 was possible.' 



§ 16. The epistemological standpoint, then, is 

 false, because it makes no allowance for the growth 

 of the faculties of the mind which It attempts to 

 analyse, and so It can not establish unknowable 

 limits to thought, or prove anything against the 

 possibility of metaphysics. But it is also so Im- 

 potent in itself, and so Inherently futile that it can- 

 not, legitimately and m accordance with Its own 

 principles, even attempt any attack upon meta- 

 physics. It is not only false, but barren. To 

 establish a proposition which may appear somewhat 

 startling, let us recollect why the Kantian doctrine 

 of Noiimena broke down. It broke down In 

 attempting to pass from phenomena to things-In- 

 themselves. And It broke down becatcse it attempted 

 to transcend itself and to ignore the limits of Its 

 method. It may be asserted further that epistem- 

 ology must break down whenever it tries to trans- 

 cend its limits, and that It Is yet under constant 

 temptation to attempt this, because if it does not and 

 keeps within its proper limits^ it is utterly useless. 



§ 17. For It professes to be nothing but an 

 "" immanent criticism of experience," an account of 

 what Is " implied in knowledge." What is Implied 

 In this attitude, however. Is, that It can neither 

 generate nor criticize actual knowledge. Given 

 actual knowledge, " Criticism " can analyse it, can 

 tell us what is Implied in it. It can show us what 

 categories we have used, and how the ''forms of 



