KANT V. METAPHYSICS. 43 



§ 1 8. It remains, as before, not only to exhibit 

 the unsoundness of the basis of epistemological 

 Agnosticism, but also to point out the flaws in 

 Kant's redtcctio ad absurditm of metaphysics. 



For it is in the negative polemic against meta- 

 physic that the chief strength of Agnosticism lies, 

 and it is by the skilfulness of its attack that it can 

 most easily cover the weakness of its own positive 

 position. Kant's description of the antinomies ot 

 metaphysics, of the contradictory necessities and 

 perplexing inadequacies which distract the human 

 mind in dealing with certain ultimate questions, is 

 deservedly famous. Their fame must be our 

 apology for stating them so briefly and for merely 

 indicatinor here the side in the conflict which w^e 

 intend subsequently to espouse. 



The difficulties of metaphysics, according to Kant, 

 fall under the three pseudo-sciences of Ontology, 

 Cosmology, and Rational Psychology, and are 

 concerned with the conceptions or " Ideas of the 

 Pure Reason,*' i,e., of God, the world, and the 

 Self. 



§ 19. With respect to the first, Kant asserts 

 that no theoretical proof of the existence of God can 

 be given, though three may be attempted. These 

 he calls the ontoloo^ical, the cosmolo^fcal and the 



o ' o 



physico- theological. 



The ontological proof infers the existence of God 

 from the necessity of the conception of a being 

 possessing all reality. We have this conception ; 

 and since real existence is included in the conception 

 of "all reality," the being we conceive must be con- 

 ceived also to have real existence. 



The cosmological proof is a form of the argument 

 from causation, and runs as follows : If anything 



