46 AGNOSTICISM. 



its first cause. On each of these subjects contra- 

 dictory propositions may be maintained, either that 

 the world is infinite in Space and Time, or that it 

 is not, etc. 



The last of these antinomies has been already 

 discussed in connection with Mr. Spencer's views 

 (§ lo), and it is here only necessary to remark, in 

 completion of what was previously asserted, that 

 Kant proves conclusively that the First Cause 

 cannot be 07ie in the series of cattsed phenomena. 

 Hence, if in seeking a cause of our world, we are 

 inquiring into the cause of existence in general, we 

 are doomed to disappointment. If all things are 

 caused, then a First Cause is impossible. If God, 

 therefore is the cause of all things, the All is God, 

 and God (in the traditional sense) is nothing. 



The antinomy of causation and freedom can be 

 profitably discussed only when we have realized the 

 origin and nature of our conception of causation 

 (v. ch. iii, § II, and App. I.). 



The second antinomy is concerned with the relat- 

 ions of part to whole : the thesis maintains that 

 unless absolutely simple substances exist, composite 

 substances are impossible, and hence nothing exists; 

 the antithesis infers the infinite divisibility of sub- 

 stances from the infinite divisibility of the Space in 

 which they exist, and asserts that simple substances 

 could never be objects of perception or of any ex- 

 perience. 



Kant's proof in the antithesis is based on several 

 assumptions. In the first place he assumes that 

 the infinite divisibility of our conception of Space 

 must be applied to the spatially-extended objects, 

 that the ideal Space which we conceive, and the 

 real Space which we perceive, are one and the 



