THE INFINITY OF TIME. 49 



inquire into its beyond. So with Time ; even if 

 we imagined an absolute beginning of the world, 

 the empty Time which preceded the existence of the 

 world, could neither itself have caused the world 

 nor have contained anything that could cause it. 



Now, as we intend to return to the subject of the 

 infinity of Space and Time (ch. vi. § 2 ff.), it will 

 here suffice to remark that Kant understates the 

 force of the argument in favour of the limitation 

 of the world in Space and Time, by stating it in 

 metaphysical terms merely. The infinity of the 

 world is indeed in metaphysical conflict with our 

 conception of a whole, and, we may add, of a process 

 and of causation, but it is also incompatible with all 

 scientific doctrines which involve these conceptions. 

 And, as we shall see, these form no Inconsiderable 

 portion of all the sciences, but one so great that 

 their abandonment would ruin many important 

 sciences like physics, mechanics, chemistry, and 

 biology, and bring universal scepticism In its train. 

 The difficulties of the thesis, therefore, are not 

 merely difficulties of metaphysics, as the agnostic 

 would make out, but also real difficulties of all 

 science. Those of the antithesis, on the other hand, 

 2iVQ purely metaphysical. They do not conflict with 

 the facts, but with our ideas. The infinity of Space 

 and Time is not, and never can be, a fact. An 

 infinite reality can never be perceived, infinity must 

 always be merely a matter of idea, merely a necess- 

 ity of thought. It is not the actual perception 

 of Space and Time that leads us to the conviction 

 that they are infinite, but the conceptions we form 

 about them. If therefore the identity and parallel- 

 ism of our ideal conceptions of Space and Time 

 which involve infinity, and our real perceptions of 



R. of S. E 



