CAN REASONING REACH TRUTH ? 89 



could be facts. There are no 'Hfs'' about facts, nor 

 can a real man be '' either dead or alive." And yet 

 it is upon devices of this sort that all our reasonings 

 rest. For all inference depends on universal pro- 

 positions, and universal propositions are all hypo- 

 thetical. They do not assert the reality of any 

 particular case, when they assert that something 

 holds good of all cases. The proposition '' all 

 infinites are unknowable " does not assert that any- 

 thing infinite exists : it equals, '' if anything is 

 infinite, it is unknowable." 



And this illustration of the superior scientific 

 importance of universal propositions leads us on to 

 another peculiarity of our science, viz., that it 

 ascribes greater truth to more general propositions. 

 It is ever aiming at generalizing phenomena, i.e, 

 at gathering together isolated phenomena under 

 general formulas common to them all, of which it 

 regards the individual phenomena as instances or 

 cases. And the more successful it is in bringing 

 out the universal relations of things, the more truly 

 scientific do we esteem it. And the higher the 

 generalization, the more completely is it deemed to 

 explain the lower and less general. Nevertheless 

 it was admitted that the individual was the Real, and 

 it must be admitted also that the less general pro- 

 positions come nearer to a description of the Real, 

 and to an expression of its individuality, than the 

 more general, which have obliterated all similitude 

 with the Real by their vague generalities. To say 

 that an individual is John Smith, is to designate 

 him more closely than to call him an Englishman, 

 or an animal, or a material substance. Thus the 

 course of truth leads directly away from reality. 

 From the standpoint of thought, the more universal 



