98 PESSIMISM 



It at once declare life evil. For though the pessimist 

 asserts this ultimately, just as the optimist asserts 

 that life Is good, he cannot do It directly. What- 

 ever testimony he may bring to the actual evils of 

 life, the optimist may refuse to conclude that the 

 evil predominates. Hence it Is only by the tend- 

 encies of things that the question can be scientific-^ 

 ally argued, and that probable but unprovable 

 assertions on either side can be established or 

 refuted. The question as to the value of life Is 

 mainly a question of Meliorism or Pejorism : for to 

 whatever side we suppose the balance to Incline at 

 the outset, It is bound to be more than counter- 

 balanced In the end by a constant tendency In the 

 opposite direction. 



§ 3. Hence we must consider the nature and 

 prospects of the four main pursuits or alms of life, 

 happiness, goodness, beauty, and knowledge, and 

 see what fate awaits the sensuous, moral, aesthetic, 

 and Intellectual enthusiasms. 



We shall consider first what Is the value of life 

 from the point of view of happiness, not only 

 because happiness is In a way the supreme end 

 including all the rest, because If It could be truly 

 attained the means would be of comparatively slight 

 Importance, or because the full and unmarred attain- 

 ment of any of the others would bring happiness in 

 its train, but also because it has been popularly 

 supposed to be the sole interest of Pessimism. It 

 has been supposed that the whole question of 

 pessimism and optimism was as to whether there 

 was a surplus of pleasure or pain in the world, and 

 implied agreement to a common hedonistic basls.-^ 



But this is really an accident of the historic 

 1 E.g. by H. Spencer: "Data of Ethics," p. 27. 



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