122 PESSIMISM. 



which for ever urged its foremost waves against 

 the adamantine rocks of Pessimism that broke and 

 shattered them, and for ever pushed forward fresh 

 breakers to carry on a futile contest. 



And, moreover, the evolutionist argument assumes 

 that the environment is constant, and that hence 

 the law of adaptation must produce happiness in the 

 end. But what if the environment is not constant, 

 but itself evolving, and evolving more rapidly than 

 our powers of adaptation ? And since the Pessimist 

 may claim to have shown that this is actually the 

 case (§§ 12-17), must not the world be growing 

 unhappler in spite of all the law of adaptation can 

 do ? Will not the constant introduction of new 

 conditions of life, to which mankind has not yet 

 grown adapted by the elimination of protesters, pro- 

 vide a constant source of Pessimism ? May not the 

 intrinsic perversity of things render adaptation 

 eternally impossible ? 



And lastly, supposing the argument to be valid, 

 would it not confirm the Pessimist in his pessimism ? 

 Would it not seem to him one more instance of the 

 utter malignity of the constitution of things, that his 

 protest should be overborne by the brutal tyranny 

 of facts, that truth should be unable to prevail, that 

 the triumphant lust of life should lead reason 

 captive ? 



It must be confessed, therefore, that the evolu- 

 tionist answer is not only theoretically insufficient, 

 but also inadequately supported by the facts. The 

 facts of life admit of the pessimistic interpretation, 

 and the difficulty is rather to see what o^/ier in- 

 terpretation they will admit of. 



§ 20. When once the possibility of happiness 

 has been disproved, no possible moral value of life 



