1 24 PESSIMISM. 



process has actually been going on, to judge by the 

 lower type of the moral ideal in modern times as 

 compared with ancient. The Greeks regarded the 

 moral man as one rejoicing in the exercise of virtue, 

 and finding his highest pleasure in virtuaus activities 

 which were the natural expression of his nature. 

 The conduct of a man who, in spite of sore tempt- 

 ation, acted rightly and controlled his evil impulses, 

 they regarded as an altogether inferior type, 

 scarcely worthy of the name of virtue. 



But with us the case is different ; the unswerving 

 performance of duty is the highest ideal to which 

 man is considered capable of aspiring ; to expect 

 him not to feel temptation, to find pleasui^e in doing 

 his duty, is to expect superhuman perfection. But 

 duty is in itself a mark of imperfection, for if there 

 were more perfect correspondence between the 

 internal nature and the external environment, be- 

 tween the feelings and the conduct required, the 

 moral act would be accompanied by pleasure, and 

 prompted by the impulse of feeling, instead of by 

 the coercive sense of duty. Our ideal of morality 

 then represents a lower stage of moral progress 

 than that of the Greeks. Are we then so far 

 inferior to them in moral development ? Assuredly 

 not ; there can be no doubt that though we are 

 further from the attainment of our moral ideal than 

 the Greeks were from theirs, we have advanced 

 immensely beyond the Greeks in this very matter 

 of morality, and that measured on an absolute scale 

 our conduct and our ideal must rank far higher 

 than theirs. Thus, if there is an absolute scale, we 

 are objectively better, though subjectively worse. 



But is there such an absolute scale ? To assert 

 this would be to assert that there is a definite limit 



