I ;6 RECONSTRUCTION. 



J 



bargain with Scepticism, and to assume provision- 

 ally the unproved hypothesis of the 7'eal validity of 

 the principles of our thought, of the substantial 

 parallelism of our thought and reality, on condition 

 of thereby solving a/l the problems of life. For it 

 would be absurd to deny that we can know, if our 

 knowledge can solve, or show the way to the solu- 

 tion of all the problems of the world. And this 

 concession must and should satisfy us. It is indeed 

 no more than what we should really have been 

 justified in demanding before we were urged to it 

 by Scepticism, that the authenticity of human 

 knowledge should be guaranteed by its capacity to 

 deal with all human problems. We may claim that, 

 if the scheme of things is rational at all, it should 

 not mock our reason with puzzles that are insoluble. 

 We must assert that either the human reason is 

 competent to solve all the difficulties that human 

 minds can properly feel, or that in all things it is 

 the plaything of an unknowable, unmanageable and 

 inexorable perversity of things. But whether we 

 might have urged this claim of our own accord or 

 not, Scepticism renders all debate superfluous : we 

 must accept its terms or give up the hope of re- 

 storing the vaHdity of knowledge. And the aspect 

 of the world which Pessimism presents to us is a no ^ 

 less stimulus in the search for a truly satisfactory 

 philosophy. It is based on a possibility which may 

 repel us, but which is so deeply rooted in the nature 

 of our world that we can never wholly reject it. It 

 thus forms an eternal contrast to the true philo- 

 sophy, the gloomy realm of shades which receives 

 the recreant outcasts from the light. 



Its conclusion that life is miserable, and not worth 

 living, was the outcome of a speculative suggestion. 



